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The PARTIES-
Plaintiffs/Appellants are Paul Puttuck, a general contractor and his residential 
home construction firm, Breakthrough Construction. 
Defendants/Appellees are the principles and owners of LRG, a Washington 
corporation. Defendants were the developers of a high end, family residence in 
Deer Valley, Utah. 
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J U R I S D I C T I O N -
U.C.A. 78-2-2 (3)(j) confers jurisdiction of this appeal on the Supreme Court. 
Subsequently, on or about 09/14/07, pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2-4 and Rule 42a of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Supreme Court transferred this 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
I S S U E S & S T A N D A R D S for R E V I E W -
No. 1- Did the trial court err in dismissing the Complaint when 
it used findings/legal conclusions from a different lawsuit 
against Appellants? 
v 
Preservation of Issue-
Record: 
Order @ 12-13, 15-16,17, Opposition @ 2-3, points 2-11; 6, 7,11 -12, 
Transcript @ 11-12. 
Standard of Review-
The standard for review is that of a mixed question of law and fact. The appellate 
review of the question of law looks for "correctness" of the trial court's legal 
conclusions and accords no deference to the trial court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, [UT., 1993]; Statev.Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah, 
1994]. The standard for review of the factual errors is from a clearly erroneous 
standard, i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence. Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v. 
Allstate, 973 P.2d 932,937 [Utah, 1998]; Grossen v. DeWitt, 369 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 
31,32, [Ut. Ct. App., 1999]; Johnson v. Higlev, 977 P.2d 1209,1214, [Ut. Ct. 
App., 1999]. 
No. 2- Did the trial court err when it made and then used unsupported 
"conclusions" to dismiss the Complaint? 
Preservation of Issue-
Record: 
Order @ 12-13,15-16, 17, Opposition® 2-3,points2-11; 6, 7,11 -12, 
Transcript @ 11-12. 
vi 
Standard of Review-
The standard for review is that of a mixed question of law and fact. The appellate 
court review of a question of law looks for "correctness" of the trial court's legal 
conclusions and accords no deference to the trial court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, [UT., 1993]; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah, 
1994]. 
The standard for review of the factual errors is from a clearly erroneous standard, 
i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young 
v. Young, 979 P.2d 338; [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d 932; 
[Utah, 1998]; Johnson v. Higlev, 977 P.2d 1209, [Ut. Ct. App., 1999]. 
No. 3- Did the trial court erred in refusing Appellants the opportunity 
to amend the Complaint without offering any justification? 
Preservation of Issue-
Record: 
Opposition @ 5,10,13, Transcript @ 13. 
Standard of Review-
The standard for review is an abuse of discretion, i.e., there is no reasonable basis 
for the decision. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 400,405 [Utah, 
1998]; Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management, 979 P.2d 363, [Ut. 
Ct. App., 1999]; Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270; Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 
476 [Ut. Q. App., 1993]. 
vii 
No. 4- Did the trial court erred when it made a wholesale 
adoption of the defense position? 
Preservation of Issue-
Record: 
Opposition @ 4-5, Transcript @ 12-13, 
Standard of Review-
The standard for review is an abuse of discretion, i.e., there is no reasonable basis 
for the decision. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light 969 P.2d 400,405 [Utah, 
19981; Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management 979 P.2d 363, [Ut. 
Ct. App., 1999]; Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270; Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 
476 [Ut. Q. App., 1993]. 
No. 5- Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' civil perjury 
cause of action, in violation of the Utah State Constitution's 
guarantee of access to the courts to redress injuries? 
Preservation of Issue-
Record: 
Opposition @ 8-9, 
Standard of Review-
The standard for review is a challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law where 
the reviewing court looks for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial 
viii 
court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, [UT., 1993] 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah, 1994] 
No. 6- Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' civil 
conspiracy claim before discovery engaged? 
Preservation of Issue-
Record: 
Opposition @ 9 - 10, Transcript @ 12-13. 
Standard of Review-
The standard for review is a challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law where 
the reviewing court looks for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial 
court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, [UT., 1993] 
State v.Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah, 1994]. 
No. 7- Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' wrongful use of a 
civil proceedings claim in finding Appellants' settlement in the 
earlier action was not a "favorable termination?" 
Preservation of Issue-
Record: 
Opposition @ 6-7, 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
ix 
Standard of Review-
The standard for review is a challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law where 
the reviewing court looks for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial 
court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, [UT., 1993] 
State v.Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah, 1994] 
No. 8- Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' abuse 
of process claim? 
Preservation of Issue-
Record: 
Opposition @ 10-11,13. 
Standard of Review-
The standard for review is a mixture of law and fact. The standard for review of a 
challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law where the reviewing court looks 
for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial court's rulings. Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, [UT., 1993] State v.Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
[Utah, 1994] 
The standard for review of the factual errors is from a clearly erroneous standard, 
i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young 
v. Young, 979 P.2d 338; [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d 932; 
[Utah, 1998]; Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209, [Ut. Ct. App., 1999]. 
x 
No. 9- Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' perjury claim 
concluding Appellants knew, or should have known, of the 
perjury when Defendants filed the counter-claim in February, 
2000? 
Preservation of Issue-
Record: 
Opposition @ 2- 3, points 3-11,11-12, Transcript @ 11-12. 
Standard of Review-
The standard for review is a mixture of law and fact. The standard for review of a 
challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law where the reviewing court looks 
for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial court's rulings. Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,235, [UT., 1993] Statev.Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
[Utah, 1994] 
The standard for review of the factual errors is from a clearly erroneous standard, 
i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young 
v. Young, 979 P.2d 338; [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d 932; 
[Utah, 1998]; Johnson v. Higlev, 977 P.2d 1209, [Ut. Ct. App., 1999]. 
CONSTITUTIONAL / STATUTORY PROVISIONS-
AU courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person .... shall have remedy by due course of 
law,.... and no person shall be barred from prosecuting .... 
any civil cause to which he is party. 
Utah Constitution- Art. 1, Sec. 11 
xi 
U.C.A. 78-11-8: 
Successive actions may be maintained upon the same contract 
or transaction whenever, after a former action, a new cause of 
action arise therefrom 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
S T A T E M E N T of CAS E-
Appellants sued Defendants alleging: 
1- Wrongful Use of a Civil Proceedings, 
2- Civil Perjury, 
3 - Obstruction of Justice, 
4- Abuse of Process and, 
5- Civil Conspiracy. 
Defendants did not Answer but immediately brought a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. After reviewing the written 
position papers and hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court granted 
Defendants' motion and dismissed all five of Appellants' claims. 
In their Opposition, Appellants had requested an opportunity to amend the 
complaint if the court found it defective. They also requested the action proceed 
with the parties having the benefits of discovery. The court denied both requests 
xii 
finding that Appellants could not cure the shortcomings in their complaint under 
any set of facts. 
STATEMENT of FACT S-
Defendants/Appellees hired Plaintiffs/Appellants Puttuck and Breakthrough to 
build a high-end, residence home in Park City. In December 1998, Defendants 
fired Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs sued them for breach of contract. Defendants 
Answered and asserted $500,000 in counter-claims for cost overruns while 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants were on the job. Subsequently, the case settled with 
Plaintiffs recovering about $80,000 from Defendants and Defendants completely 
surrendering all of their counter-claims. 
The contractor Defendants hired after they fired Appellants was John Hale and his 
company, Charis Construction. Later, Hale and Charis sued Defendants for breach 
of contract under their contract to build/complete the same Park City home 
Appellants were earlier building for Defendants. Defendants Answered and 
counter-claimed against Hale and Charis for $500,000 in costs overruns while they 
[Hale & Charis] ran the project. In the Hale-Charis lawsuit, in a deposition, 
Defendant Peter Gendron testified that the $500,000 in cost overruns asserted 
against Hale-Charis substantially overlapped some 13 months with the same 
period, with 13 months of the same incidents of mismanagement and cost 
xiii 
overruns, the Defendants had earlier cross-claimed against Appellants Puttuck and 
Breakthrough. 
Given the Defendants' testimony in the Charis lawsuit that reflected they had 
knowingly counter-sued two different general contractors in two separate lawsuits 
for the same, or substantially the same, incidents of mismanagement and cost 
overruns, Puttuck and Breakthrough then sued Defendants for: 
1- Wrongful Use of a Civil Proceedings, 
2- Civil Perjury, 
3- Obstruction of Justice, 
4- Abuse of Process and, 
5- Civil Conspiracy. 
Said claims were based on the Defendants' knowing wrongful defense of the 
lawsuit, and the Defendants knowingly asserting false counter-claim against 
Appellants in their first lawsuit. 
Defendants move for dismissal and the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
* * * * * * * * * 
XIV 
S U M M A R Y of A R G U M E N T S -
Issue No. 1-
Throughout the trial court's Ruling and Order dismissing Appellants' Complaint, it 
used findings in the Hale-Charis lawsuit as conclusive findings against the 
Appellants. The facts before the court clearly show that it misunderstood who 
were the parties to the different litigations, i.e., Appellants were not parties to the 
Hale-Charis lawsuit. Appellants assert that the court cannot simply take findings 
in one lawsuit and use those findings to "adjudicate" claims by a different party, 
in a different lawsuit alleging different claims which occurred at different times. 
Issue No. 2-
The trial court made several conclusions of law absent offering any factual support 
or explanation of the basis for the court's conclusion. In made several conclusions 
of law offering only general or overbroad factual support. In a few instances, the 
trial court merely made a global, unspecified referenced to the defense position. 
Finally, in other instances it based its conclusions of law on a clearly erroneous 
understanding of the facts, the parties and the prior, underlying litigation. The law 
requires specific findings of fact to support all legal conclusions. The trial court 
failed to do this. 
Additionally, The trial court relied upon many defense citations. The lion's share 
of said citations were out of State cases and were findings made after lengthy 
discovery, during trial and after trial. Accordingly, they were not applicable here. 
Issue No. 3-
The trial court dismissed all of the Plaintiffs' claims without permitting any 
amendment to the Complaint and before any discovery had begun. The Complaint 
put Defendants on fair notice of the claims against them. But the trial court relied 
upon many defense citations outlined in their Motion. The lion's share of said 
citations were out of State cases and findings made after lengthy discovery, during 
trial and/or after trial. Accordingly, they were not applicable. 
Appellants believe if there were any defects in their Complaint, the trial court 
should have permitted an opportunity to amend or cure their Complaint. 
Issue No. 4-
The court dismissed Appellants' Complaint without ever giving them an 
opportunity to amend it. The trial court concluded Appellants could not 
appropriately amendment their Complaint under any circumstances or set of facts. 
In concluding this, it used facts that were in error and facts from a distinct and 
separate lawsuit against Appellants. 
xvi 
Further, the trial court relied upon many defense citations. The lion's share of 
said citations were out of State cases and findings made after lengthy discovery, 
during trial and after trial. Accordingly, they were not applicable here. Appellants 
assert they deserved an opportunity to amend and it was an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion to refuse to permit any amending. 
Finally, generally under the laws of pleadings, one needs to put defendants of 
notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. Appellants Complaint 
put Defendants on fair notice of what claims they were asserting against them. 
Moreover, discovery had not yet commenced. Discovery is the legal tool to gather 
more facts in support of one's claims. 
Appellants believe the court was in error in making unsupported and clearly 
erroneous conclusions of law. 
Issue No. 5-
Appellants alleged one Defendant committed perjury in his deposition and that said 
perjury reflected the Defendants had knowingly filed false counter-claims against 
Appellants. Appellants filed a cause of action alleging civil perjury. Utah has a 
perjury cause of action in the criminal code but none in the civil code. Upon that 
basis the trial court dismissed the claim. Appellants asserted that the Utah 
xvii 
Constitution provides all citizens access to the courts to redress their legitimate 
injuries and that the court's dismissal of this action violates the Constitution. 
Additionally, the standard of proof in a civil context is far different than that 
standard of proof in the criminal law and the difference in standards itself denies 
Utahns a civil remedy. 
Issue No. 6-
The court summarily dismissed Appellants' civil conspiracy cause of action 
finding "one cannot conspire with oneself." But this is not what Appellants had 
alleged. They alleged one Defendant committed perjury, the other defendant was 
present at the purjurous statements and knew then that testimony was false and 
later that Defendant permitted the perjury/falsehoods to be part and parcel of [his] 
and the Defendants' defense in the Hale-Charis trial. Appellants believe they have 
properly alleged sufficient facts that this claim should go forward. 
Discovery is the legal tool available to litigants to find evidence supporting their 
claims. The trial court erred in not permitting Appellants to go forward with 
discovery. 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
xviii 
Issue No. 7-
Appellants' earlier litigation against Defendants resolved by way of a settlement. 
In that settlement, Defendants surrendered all their counter-claims and paid about 
$80,000 on Appellants' claims against them with their insurer, State Farm 
Insurance paying about $50,000 of the $80K. 
Later, Appellants discovered that Defendants had knowingly filed false counter-
claims against them in that earlier litigation. Appellants sued Defendants for 
wrongful use of a civil proceeding claim. The trial court found that the "favorable 
termination" finding required before a party can bring a wrongful use of civil 
proceedings claim was not present in the "settlement" termination of their earlier 
lawsuit. Thus, it dismissed this claim. 
Case law reflects that a "favorable termination" can be found in the opinion of 
someone, either the trial court or the prosecuting party, that the action lacked merit, 
or if pursued would result in a decision in favor of the defendant. Appellants assert 
that 1- their counsel was a "prosecuting party" and he would attest that the counter-
claims lacked merit, and 2- that given the perjury behind the counter-claims "if 
pursued they would result in a decision in Plaintiffs' favor' and, 3- when 
Defendants surrendered all their counter claims and settled with Appellants paying 
Appellants money that showed that the counter-claims lacked merit. 
xix 
Moreover, there is respected case law that that holds a settlement can be found to 
be a "favorable termination" of an earlier civil lawsuit. Accordingly, Appellants 
believe the court was in error. 
Issue No. 8-
In dismissing the Appellants' "abuse of process" claim, the court erroneously 
stated the Appellants wanted to re-litigate their earlier breach of contract dispute. 
But the present causes of action have no breach of contract type claims but allege 
only deceit, fraud and other tortuous claims. 
The trial court continued and stated Appellants had an, "opportunity to litigate the 
[counter-claims] in the earlier litigation." But Appellants did not become aware of 
the perjury and the falsehood behind the counter-claims asserted against them until 
Defendant Peter Gendron's deposition in the other, the later, Hale-Charis lawsuit 
In November, 2003 [or even later at the Hale-Charis trial] long after the 
Appellants' initial litigation with Defendants had settled. 
Appellants assert that the statute of limitations should have begun to run once the 
perjury was discovered. But the trial court found the Appellants knew, or should 
have known of the false counter claims in Defendants' Answer. 
Issue No. 9-
The trial court stated Appellants should have known of the falsity of the 
Defendants' counter claim when it was first asserted with the Defendants' Answer. 
But the evidence of the perjury and the false counter-claim was not discovered 
until Defendant Peter Gendron's deposition in the second, Hale-Charis lawsuit in 
November 2003. Appellants could not assert civil perjury against the Defendants 
until they discovered the perjury which was long after their initial litigation had 
settled. 
Our statute of limitation begins to run when a party knew, or reasonably should 
have known, that a claim existed. In the facts at bench, Appellants timely filed 
their claims once they knew [or should have known] of the facts supporting their 
perjury and obstruction of justice claims, etc. But the trial court found the 
Appellants knew, or should have known of the false counter claims in Defendants' 
Answer and dismissed this claim. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
xxi 
ARGUMENT S-
MARSHALING EVIDENCE-
Generally, a party must marshal all the evidence in favor of the challenged 
judgment/findings and then go forward showing just why the marshaled evidence 
is legally insufficient to sustain the judgment/verdict. But this base root of 
appellate advocacy is not without exception. The operative laws state that if the 
trial court's findings are legally insufficient, an appellant need not engage in a 
futile marshalling of [insufficiently detailed] evidence. The appellate courts say 
that if the trial court's findings are so insufficient that they fail to disclose the 
evidentiary basis for the trial court's findings they fail to provide enough 
information for a meaningful review by the appellate court. When the trial court's 
findings are inadequate for a meaningful understanding by the appellate court, 
appellant need only show the court's findings as legal insufficient. Campbell v. 
Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 639 [Ut. Ct. App., 1995]; Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 
P.2d 474,477 [Ut. Ct. App., 1991] 
Appellants assert the trial court's findings are so "conclusionary," so lacking in the 
tracking of any evidentiary basis underpinning its findings/conclusions as to make 
any "marshaling of the evidence" futile. 
1 
Appellants attack the trial court's ruling on a myriad of reasons. When Appellants 
believe that under a certain dispute the court has offered findings based upon some 
recited foundation, they then marshal the evidence on that dispute. 
I S S U E S -
No. 1- Did the trial court err in dismissing the Complaint when 
it used findings/legal conclusions from a different lawsuit 
against Appellants? 
The trial court dismissed Appellants' Complaint by applying several findings 
against Appellants made in an entirely different lawsuit. First, the court based its 
dismissal on the fact that a jury in a different case [Hale & Chairs v. Gendron & 
LRG - hereinafter Hale] involving the present Defendants found the Defendants' 
counter-claim valid because the jury awarded money on that counter-claim. 
Record, Order @ 13 But that "determination" was on a different counter-claim 
against Hale that alleged different incidents of mismanagement occurring at 
different times. Thus, the court adopted a jury's finding in a counter-claim against 
Hale to conclude the Defendants' counter-claim against Appellants was valid. But 
Appellants were not parties to the Hale litigation, so to apply Hale findings against 
them is error. See Caption pages of two prior lawsuits in Addendum, infra. 
The court went on to confirm it misunderstood the issues stating that the 
court in Hale had found that the individual Defendants had not abused the 
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corporate veil liability protections afforded them through Defendant LRG. It then 
used the Hale finding against Appellants - concluding these defendants would not 
be personally liable in the present claim. Record - Order @ 17 
Additionally, in still addressing the counter claims, the court said Appellants 
had an "opportunity to litigate that issue but plaintiffs settled the first Puttuck 
litigation and lost the second litisation in a jury trial as to their claim for breach of 
contract." Record, Order @ 15 Again, Puttuck [Appellant] was not a party to the 
Hale jury trial so: he did not lose the second litigation in a jury trial. 
The trial court's confusion continued. It said that Puttuck's settlement in the 
first litigation suggests Puttuck considered the defendants' counter-claims of 
mismanagement to have some merit. Record, Order @ 16-17 Though the facts 
were in evidence, the court did not realize that Puttuck got the money in the 
settlement and Defendants gave up their counter-claims. Record, Opposition @ 
44 point 7, 49 This suggests it was the Defendants who considered the counter-
claims to be meritless. 
The trial court cannot adopt findings in another case with different plaintiffs, 
different plaintiff claims and different counter-claims, asserted at different times 
and use those findings to dismiss Appellants' separate and distinct claims. To do 
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so clearly evidences the court abused its discretion in dismissing Appellants' 
Complaint. 
In Cazares v. Cosby, 65 P.3d 1184, 1189, [para 15] [Utah, 2003] the 
appellate court found the trial court improperly dismissed a complaint after the 
court engaged in an evidentiary hearing and used its findings from that hearing to 
dismiss the complaint. The Cazares court said the trial court erred when it applied 
its own findings of fact instead of viewing the factual allegations of the complaint 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Instantly, we find the trial court using its 
findings from a totally different claim to dismiss the complaint while it ignored the 
plaintiffs' factual allegations. 
The trial court committed error on both its understanding of the facts and the 
legal conclusions it applied to those facts. The fact application mistakes are clearly 
erroneous, i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence. As concerns the legal errors, the review manifests that the trial court 
was simply incorrect. 
No. 2- Did the trial court err when it made and then used unsupported 
"conclusions" to dismiss the Complaint? 
The trial court made far more conclusions absent any evidentiary base than those 
manifest errors in applying the Hale findings against Appellants. 
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It is the duty of the trial court to find facts upon all material issues submitted for 
decision. State v. All Real Property, 37 P.3d 276, 279, para 11 [Ut. Ct. App., 
2001]. In this instance, the trial court did not "find facts" but merely offered more 
unsubstantiated "conclusions." To wit: 
A- If the Complaint went forward, every prevailing party would then sue again 
because the losing party defended or counter-claimed.... Record @ 77 -
Order @ 11-12 
This conclusion ignores the Complaint allegation wherein Appellants assert that in 
the prior action, Defendant Peter Gendron committed perjury when testify about 
the Defendants' counter-claims against Appellants. This was not merely an 
unsubstantiated accusation for to compare Gendron's two depositions strongly 
suggest his perjury. Record- Opposition @ 44-45, points 8-11; Transcript @ 11-
12, Complaint points 9-22, 30-31, 35-37, & 42. 
This finding also ignores the fact that most times the aggrieved party does 
not discover the abuse of process, the obstruction of justice, the wrongful use of a 
civil proceeding, and the perjury and civil conspiracy perpetrated against him until 
after the initial litigation is concluded. In fact, the law is legend that in a wrongful 
use of civil proceedings, the prior litigation must have resulted in a "favorable 
termination" for plaintiff. While the court recognized that principle, it still found 
that the "settlement" between Defendants in the first Puttuck [Appellants] v. 
Defendants lawsuit was not a favorable termination by an independent decision 
maker. Record - Order @ 14. See arguments infra. 
Likewise, this conclusion ignores the fact that anyone can file a lawsuit. Those 
without merit fail, those with merit go forward. Subsequent claims frequently 
follow-up earlier litigation. So long as the claims are different they go forward. 
Presently, we have tort claims, earlier they were breach of contract type claims. 
Most importantly, the trial court's overbroad statement in summarily discharging 
all claims subsequent to an earlier lawsuit involving the same contract ignores 
U.C.A. 78-11-8: 
Successive actions may be maintained upon the same contract 
or transaction whenever, after a former action, a new cause of 
action arise therefrom. 
In this instance, subsequent to the first Puttuck action, new, valid causes of action 
arose against the Defendants. 
B- Hale sought punitive damages in the prior litigation, just as plaintiffs do 
here, and there is simply no basis for it. Record - Order 90 
The Court had no evidence, nor proffered any reasoning why it believed the 
Appellants have no basis for their punitive damage claims. Discovery had not yet 
commenced. It is the duty of the trial court to find facts upon all material issues 
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submitted for decision. In this instance, the trial court did not find any facts; the 
Record is barren beyond the court's opinion. Barren Records are error. 
The trial court's findings of fact... were inadequate, where most of 
the "findings" were conclusionary and more akin to conclusions of law, 
and provided no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial's court 
decision. Woodward v, Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 479 para 6 [Ut. Ct. App., 
1991]. 
Punitive damages are available when: ... the acts or omissions of the 
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentional fraudulent conduct, 
or conduct that manifest a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a 
disregard of, the rights of others. U.C.A. 78-18-1 Punitive damages are available 
under all of the tort causes of action Appellants alleged. Discovery could support 
the claims but to dismiss before discovery is error. The court's conclusion is 
absent any legal or factual foundation. 
C- If this case went forward, the trial would unavoidably be a trial over the 
original building disputes... This complaint in reality is simply another 
effort to prove plaintiffs in the building dispute. Record - Order @ 13-14 
The instant claims do not address any building disputes or breaches of 
contract. They are perjury, obstruction of justice, wrongful use of civil proceeding, 
abuse of process, and civil conspiracy charges. Record @ 1 -11 Clearly, these are 
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claims generated in the first Puttuck claim but not known/discovered until long 
after the close of that litigation. Record, Complaint, points 8-22, Transcript @ 12, 
Opposition @ 11-12. Thus, evidence concerning the original building disputes 
would be only tangential to the proofs of the present tort causes of action. 
The court's overbroad "reasoning" contradicts the plain dictates of U.C.A. 78-11-8 
D- Defendants would be required to attempt to prove the validity of their 
counter-claims (which they already did in Hale to the satisfaction of the 
jury)... Record - Order @ 90 
The validity or invalidity of the counter-claim in Hale is not dispositive of 
the validity of the defendants' earlier counter-claims against Appellants. 
E- Here however, these claims are just not merited and fail on many, many 
levels as outlined by defendants. The court gives no further explanation 
other than to say: there simply must be an end to things. Record - Order @ 
13 and the claims...are simply and completely without merit. Order @ 14 
Just why are the claims not merited? Why do they fail on many, many 
levels? What are the arguments outlined by defendants, that the court relied upon? 
Given the trial court's order, we are left to guess at the answers. 
F- The trial court dismissed all of the Appellants' claims without permitting 
amendment to the Complaint and before any discovery had begun. It concluded, 
void any recitation of evidence or reasoning that: Appellants could not properly 
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plea their claims. It concluded: theses claims ... are without merit and must be 
dismissed. No further factual findings or legal conclusions were offered to support 
its findings. Record - Order @ 90, 95 Opposition @ 55, Transcript @ 14 And it 
so concluded before any discovery. 
G- Finally, notwithstanding two lawsuits with different plaintiffs with different 
allegations covering different times, the trial court concluded the Hale litigation is 
part and parcel of these claims. Record, Order @ page 17 They are not. They are 
separate and distinct actions with different plaintiffs filed at different times. See 
Caption pages of two prior lawsuits in Addendum, pages 42 & 43. 
To make such governing conclusions and then deny the aggrieved party any 
inkling on the reasoning behind the conclusions is universally held to be error. The 
trial court needs to properly rule on the issues presented to it. It must make 
"findings." The Record is silent; there is no indication of the reasoning underlying 
the court's ruling. When the record is silent in not providing the reasoning of how 
the court arrived at its findings, the findings cannot be upheld. This court's rulings 
run contrary to the law's mandates under a long, clear, legal history. To wit: 
Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." [citation] 
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[Like here] in the instant case, the court failed to separate its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 52a. Campbell 
v, Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638-639 para 2 & 3 [Utah Ct. App, 1995] 
The trial court's findings of fact... were inadequate, where most of the 
"findings" were conclusionary and more akin to conclusions of law, and 
provided no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial's court decision. 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,479 para 6 [Ut. Ct. App., 1991] 
Because the trial court's finding is devoid of any analysis concerning 
the statutory criteria for advancements, the finding cannot be upheld. 
It was error to conclude that the sums of money given by Emily were 
advancements without applying the statutory standard for making such 
a determination. Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 345 para 26 [Utah, 1999] 
Like in Young, because we don't know what statutory standard the court 
used in making such a determination the finding is error. And the court's 
foundationless conclusions are fatally defective to the dismissal of the Complaint. 
Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is 
reversible error unless the facts in the record are "clear, uncontro-
verted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
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judgment." The findings of fact must show that the court's judgment 
or decree "follows logically from and is supported by, the evidence." 
The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough sub-
sidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached. State v. Real Propertv-633 East 640 
North, 942 P.2d 925, 931, para 9 [Utah, 1997] 
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact in 
a case tried by a judge is essential to resolution of dispute under proper 
rule of law. To that end findings of fact should be sufficiently detailed 
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. The rule as 
stated in Prows v. Hawlev, 271 P. 31 [Utah, 1928] is that: until the court 
has found on all the material issues raised by the pleadings, the findings 
are insufficient to support a judgment; and that findings should be 
sufficiently distinct and certain as not to require an investigation or 
review to determine what issues are decided. Rucker v. Dalton, 598 
P.2d 1316,1338-1339, para 2 [Utah, 1979]. 
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The trial court's factual errors go against the clear weight of the evidence. It 
then applied the wrong law to the factual errors. Justice demands the vacation of 
the court's findings. 
No. 3 Did the trial court erred in refusing Appellants the opportunity 
to amend the Complaint without offering any justification? 
The trial court dismissed all of the Appellants' claims without permitting 
amendment to the Complaint and before any discovery had begun. It concluded 
Appellants could not properly plea their claims. It concluded: theses claims ... are 
without merit and must be dismissed. No further factual findings or legal 
conclusions were offered to support its findings. Record - Order @ 15-18 
Opposition @ 55, Transcript @ 14 While Appellants requested an opportunity to 
amend, the court refused the request. Record, Opposition, page 13. This is 
manifest error. 
Utah requires plaintiffs to put defendants on fair notice of the general nature 
of the claims against them and an opportunity to meet them. Appellants clearly did 
so. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366,1374 
[Utah, 1996]; Rule 8, U.R.C.P.; Williams v. State Farm, 656 P.2d 966,971 
[Utah, 1992]. 
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Discovery would enable Appellants an opportunity to strengthen their claims 
with more evidence. To assume a party cannot state a claim for relief needs to be 
based on more than the court's speculations. It needs to be certain from the record 
that there are no facts that could support a claim. This Record is empty rather than 
certain. 
Dismissal of defendant's counterclaim was reversed because the 
record did not persuade the appeals court that there were no set of 
facts under which defendant might succeed. Olson v. Park-Craig-
Olson, 815 P.2d 1356, 1362 [10] [Ut. Ct. App., 1991] 
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) will be affirmed only 
if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of its 
claims. Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons, 790 P.2d 107, 110 [Ut. Ct. 
App., 1990]; Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 [Utah, 1991] 
To deny a party an opportunity to amend their complaint without articulating the 
reason is an abuse of discretion. See Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497,501 [1-2] 
[UtCt. App., 1999]. 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to state reasons for its denial 
of a motion to amend the complaint, and the reasons for the denial were 
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not apparent from the record. "A district court's refusal to grant leave to 
amend without any justifying reason is, per se, an abuse of discretion." 
[citation omitted.] Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty West Dev., 970 
P.2d 1273, 1281-1282, para 17 & 18 [Utah, 1998] 
Appellants assert they deserved an opportunity to amend and it was an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion to refuse to permit any amending. 
No. 4 Did the trial court err when it made a wholesale 
adoption of the defense position? 
The trial court adopted many defense out-of-State, citations. These citations talked 
of a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof in attacking the Complaint. 
This is the standard used after lengthy discovery, during trial or after trial. 
Appellants objected that a- such a standard was inapplicable at the pleading stage, 
b- because it was error when there had been no discovery, c- because many of the 
citations were extra Utah and thus, not controlling and, because d- the complaint 
was sufficient in putting the defendants on fair notice of the claims against them. 
Record - Order @ 90, Opposition @ 46-47; Transcript @ 12 - 13. Appellants 
argued simply that these citations were not applicable. But the court adopted the 
defendants' citations without stating why it believed they were governing. 
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The court continued: the counter-claims did not seek the same amount of 
damages, they did not rely upon the same alleged mismanagement. Records, 
Order @ 15 Appellants argued different facts alleging that Defendants were 
seeking the same damages monies against Hale and Appellants for incidents of 
mismanagement that occurred long after Appellant had left the job. Record, 
Opposition, pages 2-3, points 6-11, Page 6, Transcript 11-12 Appellants had 
alleged the defendants counter claims against Appellants covered a substantial 
period of time when Hale, not Puttuck was the general contractor. If incidents of 
mismanagement took place long after Appellants left the job, they are not liable for 
such mismanagement. For Defendants to knowingly accuse them of 
mismanagement when they knew Appellants were not liable for they were not on 
the job is wrong and an abuse of process. Record, Opposition @ pages 44-45, 53-
54, Transcript @ page 11-12 
The court adopted the defendants' "facts." A court should not merely adopt a 
party's position. Bright v. Westmoreland County. 380 F.3d 729, 731-732 
[U.S.D.C.A., 2004] In mechanically adopting the adverse party's position the 
court abused its discretion. State v. All Real Property. 37 P.3d 276, 278, para 6 
[Ut. Ct. App., 2001] Appellants have a right to an independent review of their 
claims. 
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Further, the court erred in applying a post discovery standard of proof, a trial 
standard of proof at the pleading stage. In not being the applicable standard of 
proof for a motion to dismiss, the court misunderstood the law. The court's 
misapprehension of the law is itself an adequate basis to remand for 
reconsideration. Campbell, supra @ 640 para 4. 
Finally, generally under the laws of pleadings, one needs to put defendants 
on notice of the issues raised and give them an opportunity to meet them. See 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough & Williams, supra. Plaintiffs' 
Complaint put Defendants on fair notice of what claims they were asserting against 
them. Accordingly, it was error to dismiss. 
Interestingly, in Defendants' motion, they proffered to the court two 
California cases, Rana v. Singh, and NMSBPCSLDHB v. Chavez, Record, 
Motion To Dismiss, page 4. California has prohibited courts and parties from 
citing or relying upon either case because neither case was "officially reported." 
Given that the court adopted the defendants' "authorities," this raises two 
questions: 1- did the court rely upon such authorities and, 2- how detrimental to 
Appellants was the court's reliance. There are no answers in the Order. Without 
the answers, the trial court's findings must be reversed. 
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It is clear that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the adverse 
party's position without offering any foundational reasoning for such adoption. 
This finds the trial court having no reasonable basis for its decisions. 
No. 5- Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' civil perjury 
cause of action, in violation of the Utah State Constitution's 
guarantee of access to the courts to redress injuries? 
Record, Order @ 14 Opposition @ 8-9 
Appellants alleged a Defendant committed perjury in his second \Hale] deposition 
in November,'03. That perjury reflected that Defendants' original counter-claim 
against Appellants was false. Utah has a perjury cause of action in the criminal 
code but none in the civil code. Upon that basis, the trial court dismissed the 
claim. Record Order, page 14. Appellants assert that the Utah Constitution 
provides all citizens access to the courts to redress their legitimate injuries and that 
the court's dismissal of this action violates the Constitution. Record, Opposition, 
page 8. Additionally, the standard of proof in a civil context is far less burdensome 
than the standard of proof required in criminal law. Presently, if one suffers from 
civil perjury but cannot prove the perjury facts "beyond a reasonable doubt" he/she 
has no redress for their injury. This higher burden of proof also deprives the 
injured of their right of access to the courts. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person .... shall have remedy by due course of 
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law,.... and no person shall be barred from prosecuting .... 
any civil cause to which he is party. 
Utah Constitution- Art. 1, Sec. 11 
In Homes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 848 [2] [D.C., Ct. App., 
1998], plaintiff brought a cause of action for spoliation of evidence. This District 
Court had not recognized that cause of action before. But the court adopted it 
saying: new torts are recognized when an interest requiring protection from 
unreasonable interference is identified; and that a plaintiff advancing a novel claim 
in this jurisdiction will not necessarily be precluded from recovering. This is 
Appellants' predicament. The court went on to say: 
If we are in one of the "open spaces" in the law of this jurisdiction we 
must fill it as well as we can, with a view to the social interests which 
seem to be involved and with such aid as we can get from authorities 
elsewhere and from "logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the 
accepted standards of right conduct." We cannot evade this duty; for 
unless we establish a right in the plaintiff we establish a privilege or 
immunity in the defendant.... In recognizing the independent tort action, 
we do not exercise a legislative function; rather, we perform our duty to 
decide "a question of policy" well within the framework of traditional 
and accepted negligence principles. Id. @ 848-849 [underscore added] 
18 
In Harmon City v. Neilsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162,1171 [Utah, 1995], 
the Supreme Court denied an ERISA preemption of the plaintiffs' legal mal-
practice claims because to do so, "would leave them without any legal remedy." 
Later, in keeping with that same reasoning, in DOIT v. Touche, Ross & 
Co., 926 P.2d 835, 842 Ftnt.ll [Utah, 1996] the same Court indicated merely 
because a cause of action had not been recognized did not mean it would be 
precluded by such novelty: 
... we have been unable to find any legal precedent which indicates 
that such a cause of action exists in Utah Thus, even if we were 
to recognize that such a cause of action exists in Utah, plaintiffs 
have failed to properly plead it. [underscore added] 
Under the Constitutional mandates of the "open courts" provision together 
with the Supreme Court's "need-to-do justice, reasoning," Utah needs to address 
an injury for which it presently provides no redress and adopt a civil perjury cause 
of action. To do otherwise gives immunity to wrongdoers and leaves victims 
without a remedy. 
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Obstruction of Justice-
Appellants make the very same argument against the trial court's dismissal 
of their "obstruction of justice" claim. This cause of action followed the civil 
conspiracy claim. In the trial court's Order immediately after addressing the civil 
conspiracy claim it said: That too relies on the same basis. Record, Order, page 
15. We are left to guess what the court meant by using the term "on the same 
basis. " Assuming arguendo, the trial court dismissed this cause of action because 
it is not recognized in Utah's civil law protections, Appellants incorporate the 
foregoing arguments and authorities set forth immediately above under their civil 
perjury claim and asserts those same arguments against the trial court's dismissal 
of Appellants' obstruction of justice claim. 
Additionally, Appellants argue that because the court offers no support, no 
reasoning for its conclusion Appellants and all reviewers are left to guess how the 
court arrived at its conclusion. Under the dictates of: State v. All Real Property, 
Campbell Woodward, Young, State v. Real Property - 633 E. 640 N., Prows 
v. Hawley and Rucker, all supra, this court must vacate the trial court's 
conclusion. 
Again, on this claim the court continues in its erroneous applications of Hale 
findings [the Hale's jury findings on the validity of the Defendants' counter-claim, 
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etc.] against the non-party, Appellants. Record, Order page 15. Appellants here 
incorporate their arguments against the trial court applying the Hale findings 
against Appellants they set forth under Issue No. 1, supra. 
The trial court's dismissal of this cause of action ignored the governing law 
requiring reversal of the dismissal. 
No. 6- Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' civil 
conspiracy claim before discovery engaged? 
The court summarily dismissed this cause of action finding: one cannot conspire 
with oneself. Record, Order page 16 While this is true, it is not what Appellants 
had alleged. They alleged one Defendant committed perjury, the other defendant 
was present at the purjurous statements, knew then they were false and later 
permitted the falsehoods to be part and parcel of the Defendants' defense in the 
Hale trial. Record, Opposition, pages 9-10. Legally, in certain situations, one 
person can "ratify" the misconduct of another and under such ratification the 
ratifying person can be held liable. Instantly, the court misunderstood the facts and 
the misunderstandings led to improperly dismissing this cause of action. 
Appellants' Complaint had alleged Defendant Peter Gendron conspired to assert 
false counter claims against them and that Defendant William Gendron was aware 
of the falsity of the counter-claims and subsequent to Peter Genrdon's deposition, 
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William Gendron adopted or ratified his brother's perjury. Record, Complaint @ 
points 20, 30, 31, 37, 38,42, & 47. 
Importantly, discovery had not yet commenced. Discovery is the legal tool 
to gather more facts in support of one's claims. On the facts in issue, how can a 
court conclude there was no conspiracy when there has been no discovery? The 
parties use discovery to find evidence to complete their initial broad factual 
allegations. Discovery could further support Appellants' allegations. To make 
such a finding before discovery has commenced is error. To make such a finding 
when the trial court ignores the allegations of the complaint is also error for the 
court is to "deem the allegations of the complaint as true." See law ofHunsaker 
v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 897-898 [Utah, 1993] and St Benedict's Dev. v. St 
Benedict's Hopsital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 [Utah, 1991]. 
No. 7- Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' wrongful use 
of a civil proceedings claim in finding Appellants' settlement 
in the earlier action was not a "favorable termination?" 
Record, Order @ 14 
The court found Appellants settlement in the earlier action was not a "favorable 
termination." It said Appellants needed to show: an independent decision maker 
determined the court claim of defendant had no merit. Record, Order page 14 
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Requiring an independent decision maker is not the law. Misuse of legal process 
becomes actionable when it is used primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it 
was not designed. To state a claim for abuse of process, a party must allege both 
an ulterior purpose and a willful act in the process not proper in the regular conduct 
of the proceedings. To satisfy the willful act requirement of a claim for abuse of 
process, a party must point to conduct independent of legal process itself that 
corroborates the alleged improper purpose. Hatch v. Davis, 147 P. 3d 383, 389-
390 [para 36 & 39 ] [Utah, 2006]. Appellants alleged that the Defendants' 
improper motive was to intimidate and harass them and to injure Appellants' 
business reputation. Further, Appellants assert for one to commit perjury in a 
deposition is a "willful act in the process not proper in the regular proceedings" of 
that earlier lawsuit. Additionally, Appellants argue another "willful act" was the 
Defendants knowingly asserting counter-claims clearly attributable to Hale against 
Appellants. Record, Complaint @ point 25, Opposition pages 10-11. 
In Lacknerv. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d. 747, 750, [Cal. 1979], the Supreme 
Court said a "favorable termination" needs to reflect the opinion of someone, either 
the trial court or the prosecuting party, that the action lacked merit or if pursued 
would result in a decision in favor of defendant. Appellants assert that 1- their 
counsel was a "prosecuting party" in the earlier action and via Rule 12 of the 
U.R.C.P., Appellants' Complaint facts attest that the counter-claims lacked merit, 
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2- that given the perjury behind the counter-claims if they were "pursued they 
would result in a decision in Plaintiffs' favor" and, 3- when Defendants 
surrendered all their counter-claims and settled with Plaintiffs [Appellants] paying 
them money those points evidence the counter-claims lacked merit. Appellants 
assert the settlement under these conditions is, or should be equated with a 
"favorable termination" and thus, the cause of action should proceed. 
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that State Farm Insurance 
paid Appellants some $50,000 [of $80,000] in settling the Appellants' claims. So, 
we find State Farm, an interested party with financial interests at stake, believing 
the Appellants' claims had merit and the Defendants', their insured's counter 
claims were meritless. And since Defendants personally contributed $30,000 to 
the settlement and surrendered all their counterclaims in this action also reflects 
their belief in the merits of Appellants' claims and the lack of merit in their 
counter-claims. 
Appellants' research seems indicate that there is no direct Utah case law that 
addresses a "settlement" in the context of being a "favorable termination" for the 
subsequent prosecution of a wrongful use of a civil proceedings claim. But there 
are respected, sister-state authorities that find a civil settlement that ends the 
litigation to be a "favorable" termination. 
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The question of whether there has been a settlement between the 
parties or consent to a dismissal or acquiescence would be a factor 
to be considered in differentiating a malicious prosecution pleading 
based upon misuse of civil process from a pleading based upon 
misuse of criminal process. 
Webb v. Youmans, 248 Cal.App. 2d 851, 854 [Cal. Ct. App., 1967] 
This case meets all of the criteria mentioned in Webb. In the settlement 
between Appellants and Defendants in the earlier lawsuit we find: 
A- There was a settlement; 
B- It concluded the litigation with Appellants dismissing their claims 
and Defendants dismissing their counter claims with prejudice. 
C- Defendants consented to the dismissal of their counter claims; 
D- Defendants acquiesced in paying Appellants the settlement monies; and, 
E- Appellants dismissed their claims based entirely upon getting the 
settlement monies. 
Thus, the settlement here properly should be equated with a favorable termination. 
In Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal. App. 3d 823, 826 [Cal. Ct. App., 1978] the court 
said: 
... Of course where the termination of the former proceeding is not 
on the merits it is somewhat more difficult to ascertain whether it 
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indicates the innocence of the defendant in the action. Nevertheless, 
the theory is the same in testing a dismissal or other termination 
without a trial on the merits. "If it is of such a nature as to indicate the 
innocence of the accused, it is a favorable termination sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement. If however, the dismissal is on technical 
grounds, for procedural reasons, or for any other reason not incon-
sistent with his guilt, it does not constitute a favorable termination." 
This settlement reflects the lack of merit in the Defendants' counter-claims 
together with Appellants' innocence. It is not a technical dismissal. It is a 
termination consistent with Appellants' innocence of the counter-claims. 
In Hurgren v. Union Mutual Life Ins,, 141 Cal. 585, 588; [Cal., 1904] the 
court said: 
Nor can it be essentially necessary that there should be an 
adjudication of the magistrate, or, indeed any judicial decision 
upon the merits by any court.. ..the technical prerequisite is 
only that the particular prosecution be disposed of in such a 
manner that it cannot be revived the mere discontinuance 
of a civil suit, in any way, satisfies the rule. 
Appellants settlement and dismissal of the parties claims fully meets the 
"discontinuance of their earlier civil lawsuit" pre-requisite. 
No. 8 Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants9 
abuse of process claim? 
The court dismissed this cause of action by stating: the fourth cause of action is the 
same. Record, Order @ 15 [The court does not reference the cause of action by 
name. But "abuse of process" is the fourth cause of action in the Complaint, 
(Record, Complaint @ 9)] What the court means by the fourth cause of action "is 
the same" is not explained. One is left to guess what the court is thinking. 
The court does say: 
it relies again on plaintiffs simple attempt to relitigate the building 
dispute. The counter-claim was directly related to the building issues, 
claiming defendants had not breached the contract but plaintiff 
Puttuck and Plaintiff Hale at various times had breached the contract 
and caused damages to mismanagement. The counter claim did not 
seek the same amount of damages they did not rely on the same 
alleged mis-management. There was opportunity to litigate that 
issue but the plaintiff settled the first Puttuck litigation and lost the 
second litigation in a jury trial as to their claim of breach of contract 
To now claim that in fact they should have one because defendants 
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lied again does nothing but invite great mischief into our already 
burdened system. Record, Order @ 15 - 16 
The court is confused with the facts: 
A- Appellant Puttuck and Hale are involved in two different lawsuits with 
Hale's filing almost 3 years after Appellants. 
B- In Puttuck's first lawsuit, Defendants counter-claimed for $500,000 for 
mismanagement occurring from 03/98 to 02/23/00. 
C- In Hale's lawsuit, Defendants counterclaimed for $500,000 for 
mismanagement occurring from 01/07/99 to 08/20/00 
Record, Complaint @ 3-4, Opposition @ 2-3, Transcript @ 11 -12. 
Defendants demanded $500,000 against both plaintiffs for the same incidents of 
mismanagement which overlapped for 14 months and as against Puttuck for 14 
months after he had left the job in December 98. [Record, Opposition @ 2-3, 
Transcript® 11-12] 
D- Puttuck could not litigate his abuse of process claim when it was first 
discovered after his initial litigation had settled. 
E- Puttuck did not lose the second litigation in a jury trial as to their claim of 
breach of contract. He was not a party to the Hale litigation and had no 
claims against Defendants in that lawsuit. 
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The elements of abuse of process are: an ulterior motive and a willful act in the 
use of the process not proper in the regular course of the proceedings. See Hatch, 
supra @ para 34. Appellants had alleged an ulterior purpose in that Defendants' 
filed their counter claim to "intimidate" Appellants. They alleged the willful act 
not proper in the litigation proceedings was both knowingly asserting false 
counter-claims and the perjured deposition testimony. Record, Complaint @ 9-10, 
Opposition @ 6-7, 10. 
Concluding, the trial court again dismissed the claim notwithstanding that 
Appellants had alleged the elements of the tort, and because the court was 
confused about the parties and issues before it. The trial court's reasoning is 
directly contradictory to the facts and parties before it which errors wrongful 
denied Appellants' the opportunity to fully present their claims. 
No. 9- Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants9 perjury claim 
concluding Appellants knew, or should have known, of the 
perjury when Defendants filed the counter-claim in February, 
2000? 
The trial court concluded Appellants should have known of the falsity of the 
Defendants' counter claim when it was first asserted in the Defendants' Answer in 
the earlier Puttuck/Appellants v. Defendants' action. "It was either known to be 
false from the first time it was alleged or it was not. " The court did not explain the 
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basis for this conclusion. Record, Order @ 16 But Appellants alleged they did 
not discover the evidence of the false counter-claims until Defendant Peter 
Gendron's deposition in the second, Hale lawsuit, in 11/03. In February, 2000, at 
Defendant Peter Gendron's first deposition, Appellants did not know he was lying 
nor through the use of reasonable efforts could they have discovered Peter 
Gendron's perjury. Record, Complaint, points 8-20, Opposition @ 11, Transcript 
@ 12. Understandably, Appellants could not assert perjury against the Defendants 
until they first discovered the perjury in November '03 when he testified about the 
counter-claim in substantial contradiction to his 02/2000 testimony. This was long 
after Appellants had settled their initial litigation with Defendants. Record, 
Opposition @ page 2-3, points 3-11, pages 11-12, Transcript @ 11. Our laws 
favor the Appellants' position. 
Our statute of limitation begins to run when a party knew, or 
reasonably should have known, that a claim existed.... Statute 
under which limitations period governing actions for relief 
from fraud or mistake does not accrue until discovery of facts 
surrounding fraud or mistake....Klinger v. Calder, 791 P.2d 
868, 869-870 [Utah, 1990] 
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In the facts at bench, Appellants timely filed their claims once they knew [or 
should have known] of the facts supporting the perjury and obstruction of justice 
claims, etc. Appellants' discovery of the causes of action in November '03 finds 
the Complaint filed within the four-year statute of limitations. 
Tolling of Statute of Limitations-
Assuming arguendo, Appellants filed their Complaint in breach of the statute of 
limitations, the jurisprudence reasoning behind having a limited time within which 
to prosecute one's claim is not without justifiably exception. 
The discovery rule for tolling limitations period applies in three 
situations: 1- where mandated by statute, 2- where defendant 
concealed or misled claimant so, claimant did not become aware 
of cause of action until too late; and, 3- exceptional circumstances 
where application of general rule would be irrational or unjust. 
Sew v. Security Title Co, 902 P.2d 629, 637 [13]; citing Warren v. 
Provo, 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 [Utah, 1992] 
Defendants' false counter-claims misled Appellants so they did not become 
aware of the perjury and the false counter claims until after the statute has run. 
Given the deceit, this court should toll the statute. 
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To engage the exceptional circumstances or concealment versions of the 
discovery rule, plaintiff must make an initial showing that plaintiff did not know 
and could not have reasonably discovered the underlying cause of action. Walker 
Drug v. La Sal Oil, 902 P.2d 1229,1231 [3] [Utah, 1995]. Appellants have done 
this. Record, Opposition, pages 2-3, points 5-11, pages 3-4, points 1-3, pages 11-
12, Transcript @ 11-12. 
Sew, goes on to offer a balancing test to determine if exceptional 
circumstances exist to toll the statute. The test compares the hardships imposed on 
Plaintiffs by denying to toll the statute against the prejudice to defendants resulting 
from the passage of time by tolling it. Sew, supra, @ 636 [14-15] Here, to deny 
finding exceptional circumstances will result in the Appellants having no remedy 
for the financial harm they suffered. Whereas, to toll the statute does not result in 
any prejudice to defendants "resulting from the passage of time." 
Appellants present predicament in not unlike the Plaintiffs in Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 @ 4 [Utah, 1981]. In Myers, the court found that 
where guardians had no knowledge of their ward's death ... and therefore no 
knowledge that cause existed until after two-year limitation period had expired, 
.. .the policy against stale claims was outweighed by unique circumstances. It thus 
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found, the trial court improperly dismissed the guardian's action on a statute of 
limitations basis. 
The policy against stale claims is also outweighed by the unique 
circumstances of plaintiff s hardship. Defendant cannot establish 
that he was prejudiced by having to defend a stale claim since his 
problems of proof occasioned by the delay are no greater than 
plaintiffs'. Myers, supra, @ 88 [3] 
Exactly like in Myers, the present Appellees cannot show any prejudice. This is 
especially true since all of the causes of action directly involve the defendants' 
personal knowledge and their conduct/misconduct. There are no unavailable 
witnesses, nor any lost evidence. It is fair for this court to find the statute tolled 
until the Appellants first discovered the perjured testimony. 
Alternatively, in Warren, supra @ 1129 [7] the court said the trial court 
could side-step the balancing test where the case: presents exceptional 
circumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or 
unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of 
the cause of action. So, in all events, Appellants believe this holding governs the 
present state of the case. 
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Complaint Allegations Are Deemed True-
A basic foundation of all determinations on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is that the court 
is to accept as true the plaintiffs allegations: 
we accept the factual allegations in the complaint to be true and 
consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn there from in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 
893, 897-898 [Utah, 1993] Accordingly, we state the facts in a light 
most favorable to the party against whom the rule 12(b)(6) motion 
was brought. St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hopsital, 811 
P.2d 194,196 [Utah, 1991]; Harmon City, supra, @ 1164, Ftnt. 2. 
Again, in Wagner v. State, 122 P.2d 599, 602 [para 2 & 9]; [Utah, 2005] the 
Supreme Court said: 
On review of grant of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, the Supreme Court must accept 
the material allegations in the complaint as true.... 
Instantly, the trial court sided with the defense factual contentions. But to follow 
the mandates of the law required the trial judge to accept the Appellants factual 
allegations as set forth in their Complaint as true. If the trial court had followed 
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the law, it would not have dismissed Appellants' complaint on statute of limitation 
grounds. 
Factual Determinations-
Importantly, for the court to find that Appellants discovered, or should have 
discovered, the perjury earlier is a "factual determination" removing it from the 
province of the trial court's authority. In Russell/Packard v. Carson, 78 P.3d 
616, ... aff d. 108 P.3d 741, 751 para 40; [Ut.Ct. App., 2003], the court said: 
the trial court erred in dismissing claims on grounds they were 
barred by applicable statute of limitations. Whether plaintiff made 
a prima facie showing that a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the claims earlier was a factual finding that should be 
decided by a jury, not a judge. 
Instantly, the facts underlying the discovery question is fact question 
needing to be resolved by a jury. Record, Transcript @ 13 Whether the discovery 
rule tolls the statute of limitation is a (t classic factual dispute " when there is 
contrary factual evidence and properly should be resolved by finder of fact. Sew, 
@ 634, [9-10]. 
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The review of a court's interpretation of the statute of limitation is a legal 
question inspected for "correctness." But in this instance, the court's application 
of the statute of limitations is fact determinative. And here the court was in error 
on the facts. 
CONCLUSION-
A basic tenant of our rules of jurisprudence is that: courts should be liberal in 
allowing amendments to the end that cases may be fully and fairly presented on 
their merits. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403,408 [Utah, 1998] 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1183 [Utah, 1993] 
Rule 15(a) of the U.R.C.P., talks about amending pleadings and in pertinent part it 
says: .. .a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court.... and leave shall 
be freely given when justice so requires. Moreover, rule 15 should be interpreted 
liberally so as to allow the parties to have their claims fully adjudicated. Timm v. 
Dewsnup, supra, @ 1183; Sulzen, supra @ 501, para 13. 
This trial court denied Appellants an opportunity to amend their complaint. It 
based said denial on the fact that it made several conclusions of fact and of law: 
a- without offering any explanation for the court's reasoning, 
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b- without offering any factual support, 
c- by offering "facts" there were in error, and, 
d- by applying the law in error. 
No Explanations & No Factual Support-
The law, however, requires specific findings of fact to support all legal 
conclusions. 
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of 
acts in a case tried by a judge is essential to resolution of dispute 
under proper rule of law. To that end findings of fact should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached. Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1316,1338-1339 [Utah, 1979] 
Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Campbell, 
supra, @ 638-639. 
Instantly, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to state reason for its 
denial of a motion to amend the complaint, and the reasons for the denial were not 
apparent from the record. Aurora, supra @ 1281-1282 
Factual & Legal Errors-
Throughout the Court's ruling it used findings in the Hale lawsuit as conclusive 
against the Appellants. A court cannot simply take findings in one lawsuit and use 
those findings to "adjudicate" claims by a different party, in a different lawsuit 
alleging different mismanagement claims which occurred at different times. 
Simply put, findings against one party in one lawsuit cannot be applied to a 
different party in a different lawsuit. 
Ignoring Complaint Allegations-
In this instance, the trial court made its findings in a blatant disregard for the 
"facts" set forth in the Complaint. Then it relied upon its findings to dismiss the 
Complaint. This is wrong. 
When reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss, the court must 
accept the factual allegations in the complaint to be true and 
consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn there from 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunsaker, supra, @ 
897-898; St Benedict's Dev., supra, @ 196. 
38 
For the many reasoned arguments set forth hereinabove, this Court properly should 
reverse the trial court's dismissal of the Appellants' Complaint. Appellants should 
have the opportunity to fully present their claims. The defendants will have ample 
opportunity to fully defend or defeat said claims through the regular processing of 
the lawsuit. 
Date: 27, December 2007 i Resmakfiilly submitted; 
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PROOF of SERVICE-
I certified that I caused to be mailed, via first class U.S. P.S. mail, a true 
and correct copy of the APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF on this 
>th 28 day of December, 2007 to the following: 
HEATHER WHITE 
Snow Christensen & Martineau 
P.O.B. 45000 
Salt Lake, UT 84111 
BRUCE LUBECK 
Judge - District Court 
6300 No. Silver Creek 
Park City, UT 84098 
( wo&ecuted in Salt Lake this day. 
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A D D E N D U M -
APPELLANTS' REQUEST TO AUGMENT 
APPELLATE RECORD 
Comes now Appellants and respectfully requests the Court's permission to 
augment the record on appeal. 
At the time of the motion to dismiss now under review, Appellants referred the 
trial court to the complaint, the date of filing and the parties in the prior litigations 
of: 
PAUL PUTTUCK & BREAKTHROUGH CONSTRUCTION 
Vs. 
PETER GENDRON, LRG, Inc., and KENNETH B. McINTOSH 
T.J.D.C No.: 99-0600212 
Complaint, caption page - page 42 
And, 
JOHN HALE & CHARIS CONSTRUCTION 
Vs. 
PETER GENDRON, WILLIAM GENDRON, HANK LANGE 
and LRG, Inc. 
T.J.D.C. No.: 02-0500738 CN 
Complaint, caption page - page 43 
Appellants believe the addition of these pages will clarify the facts for the Court 
and support Appellants' arguments. 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
JOHN F. FAY, Esq. 
Legal Counsel 
P. 0 . Box 68-1454 
Park City, UT 84068-1454 
Tel: 435.658.2441 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
USB No. 5691 
*ul-. i|*lvi 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and 
PAUL PUTTUCK dba, BREAKTHROUGH 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PETER GENDRON, LRG, Inc., GENDRON, 
LIM & COMPANY, and KENNETH 
McINTOSH, and Does 1 thru 20, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT TO FORCLOSE ON 
REAL PROPERTY LD2N and FOR 
PERSONAL JUDGMENTS. 
Civil No.: T?-fl6(R>2.a 
JUDGE: PAT BRIAN 
Comes now Plaintiffs and allege: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND: 
1) Plaintiff Paul Puttuck is now, and at all relevant times was, a resident of Park City, Summit County, 
Utah all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district. 
2) Plaintiff Puttuck is now, and at all relevant times was, the sole owner of Plaintiff Breakthrough 
Construction, a Park City, Summit County, Utah general contractor business. Puttuck is duly licensed by 
the State of Utah as a general contractor. Breakthrough Construction builds homes in and about Park City 
and Summit County, Utah. 
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* * * * * 
JOHN F. FAY, Esq. 
Trial Counsel 
Gregory Barton & Swapp 
Suite 300 
2975 West Executive Plcwy 
Lehi, UT 84043 
Tel: 801.990.1919 
Fax.: 801.990.1976 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN HALE, an individual and CHARIS ) 
CONSTRUCTION, ) COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
) and JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
PETER GENDRON, WELLIAM GENDRON,) Civil No.: d>/)S&> 13& {7iV 
HANK LANGE and LRG, Inc., and Does 1 ) 
thru 10, Inclusive, ) JUDGE: BRUCE LUBECK 
Defendants. ) 
Comes now Plaintiffs and allege: 
FACTUAL_J5ACKGROUND: 
1- Plaintiff JOHN HALE [hereinafter HALE] is now, and at all relevant times was, a resident 
of Salt Lake City and County, Utah all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district. 
2- Plaintiff HALE is now, and at all relevant times was, the co-owner of Plaintiff CHAPJS 
CONSTRUCTION, hereinafter CHARIS] a general contractor busmess in Park City, Utah. HALE is 
duly licensed by the State of Utah as a general contractor. CHAPJS builds homes and does other con-
struction business in and about Park City in Summit County and Salt Lake City and County, Utah 
USB No. 5691 ;KIHD DISTRICT COURT-SUIWI 
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